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Abstract
The value of a zero-sum differential games is known to exist, under Isaacs’ con-
dition, as the unique viscosity solution of a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. In
this note we provide a self-contained proof based on the construction of ε-optimal
strategies, which is inspired by the “extremal aiming” method from [3].
1 Comparison of trajectories
Let U and V be compact subsets of some euclidean space, let ‖ · ‖ be the euclidean
norm in Rn, and let f : [0, 1]×Rn ×U × V → Rn. Let Π = {t0 < t1 < · · · < tN} be
a set of times in [0, 1], and let ‖Π‖ := max1≤m≤N tm − tm−1. For any Z ⊂ R
n, let
D(x,Z) := infz∈Z ‖x− z‖ be the usual distance to the set Z.
Assumption 1:
a. f is uniformly bounded, i.e. ‖f‖ := sup(t,x,u,v) ‖f(t, x, u, v)‖ < +∞.
b. There exists c ≥ 0 such that: ∀(u, v) ∈ U × V, ∀s, t ∈ [0, 1], ∀x, y ∈ Rn,
‖f(t, x, u, v) − f(s, y, u, v)‖ ≤ c
(
|t− s|+ ‖x− y‖
)
.
The local game: For any (t, x) ∈ [0, 1] × Rn and any ξ ∈ Rn, consider the
one-shot game with actions sets U and V and payoff function:
(u, v) 7→ 〈ξ, f(t, x, u, v)〉.
Let this game be denoted by Γ(t, x, ξ), and let H−(t, x, ξ) and H+(t, x, ξ) be its
maxmin and minmax respectively:
H−(t, x, ξ) := max
u∈U
min
v∈V
〈ξ, f(t, x, u, v)〉,
H+(t, x, ξ) := min
v∈V
max
u∈U
〈ξ, f(t, x, u, v)〉.
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Sorin for their careful reading and comments on earlier drafts. This work was partially supported by
the Commission of the European Communities under the 7th Framework Programme Marie Curie Initial
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These functions satisfy H− ≤ H+. If the equality H+(t, x, ξ) = H−(t, x, ξ) holds,
the game Γ(t, x, ξ) has a value, denoted by H(t, x, ξ).
Assumption 2: Γ(t, x, ξ) has a value for all (t, x, ξ) ∈ [0, 1] × Rn × Rn.
We suppose that the Assumptions 1 and 2 hold in the rest of the paper.
1.1 A key Lemma
Introduce the sets of controls:
U = {u : [0, 1] → U, measurable}, V = {v : [0, 1] → V, measurable}.
Elements of U and V will be identified with constant controls. For any (t0, z0,u,v) ∈
[0, 1] × Rn × U × V denote by z[t0, z0,u,v] the solution of:
z˙(t) = f(t, z(t),u(t),v(t)), z(t0) = z0.
Let (u,v) ∈ U ×V be a pair of controls, t0 ∈ [0, 1] an initial time, (x0, w0) ∈ (R
n)2 a
pair of initial positions, and (u∗, v∗) a couple of optimal actions in Γ(t0, x0, x0−w0).
Note any pair (u, v) ∈ U × V is optimal in this local game if x0 = w0. Consider
x(t) := x[t0, x0,u, v
∗](t) and w(t) := w[t0, w0, u
∗,v](t). The following lemma is
inspired by Lemma 2.3.1 in [3]. The existence of the value in the local games will
be used to bound the distance between these two trajectories.
Lemma 1.1. There exists real numbers A,B ≥ 0 such that for all t ∈ [t0, 1]:
‖x(t)−w(t)‖2 ≤ (1 + (t− t0)A)‖x0 − w0‖
2 +B(t− t0)
2.
Proof. Let d0 := ‖x0 − w0‖ and d(t) := ‖x(t) −w(t)‖. Then:
d
2(t) = ‖(x0 − w0) +
∫ t
t0
f(s,x(s),u(s), v∗)− f(s,w(s), u∗,v(s))ds‖2. (1.1)
The boundedness of f implies that:∥∥∥∥∫ t
t0
f(s,x(s),u(s), v∗)− f(s,w(s), u∗,v(s))ds
∥∥∥∥2 ≤ 4‖f‖2(t− t0)2. (1.2)
Claim: For all s ∈ [t0, 1], and for all (u, v) ∈ U × V :
〈x0 − w0, f(s,x(s), u, v
∗)− f(s,w(s), u∗, v)ds〉 ≤ 2C(s)d0 + cd
2
0, (1.3)
where C(s) := c(1 + ‖f‖)(s− t0).
Let us prove this claim. Assumption 1 implies ‖x(s)− x0‖ ≤ (s− t0)‖f‖, and then:
‖f(s,x(s), u, v∗)− f(t0, x0, u, v
∗)‖ ≤ c
(
(s− t0) + ‖f‖(s− t0)
)
= C(s).
From Cauchy-Schwartz inequality and the optimality of v∗ one gets:
〈x0 − w0, f(s,x(s), u, v
∗)〉 ≤ 〈x0 − w0, f(t0, x0, u, v
∗)〉+ C(s)d0, (1.4)
≤ H+(t0, x0, x0 − w0) + C(s)d0. (1.5)
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Similarly, Assumption 1 implies ‖w(s)− x0‖ ≤ d0 + (s− t0)‖f‖, and then:
‖f(s,w(s), u∗, v)− f(t0, x0, u
∗, v)‖ ≤ C(s) + cd0.
Using Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, and the optimality of u∗:
〈x0 − w0, f(s,w(s), u
∗, v)〉 ≥ 〈x0 − w0, f(t0, x0, u
∗, v)〉 − (C(s) + cd0)d0, (1.6)
≥ H−(t0, x0, x0 − w0)− C(s)d0 − cd
2
0. (1.7)
The claim follows: substract the inequalities (1.5) anc (1.7) and use Assumption 2
to cancel (H+ −H−)(t0, x0, x0 − w0).
In particular, it holds for (u, v) = (u(s),v(s)). Note that
∫ t
t0
2C(s)ds = (t− t0)C(t).
Thus, integrating (1.3) over [t0, t] yields:∫ t
t0
〈x0 − w0, f(s,x(s),u(s), v
∗)− f(s,w(s), u∗,v(s))ds〉 ≤ (t− t0)(C(t)d0 + cd
2
0).
(1.8)
Using the estimates (1.2) and (1.8) in (1.1) we obtain:
d
2(t) ≤ d20 + 4‖f‖
2(t− t0)
2 + 2(t− t0)C(t)d0 + 2c(t − t0)d
2
0.
Finally, use the relations d0 ≤ 1 + d
2
0, C(t) ≤ c(1 + ‖f‖) and (t − t0)C(t) = c(1 +
‖f‖)(t−t0)
2. The result follows with A = 3c+2‖f‖ and B = 4‖f‖2+2c(1+‖f‖).
1.2 Consequences
In this section, we give three direct consequences of Lemma 1.1. In Section 1.2.1, we
use the set of times Π to construct two trajectories on [t0, tN ] inductively. Applying
the lemma to the intervals [tm, tm+1], from m = 0 to N − 1, we obtain a bound
for the distance between the two at time tN . In particular, the distance vanishes as
‖Π‖ and ‖x0−w0‖ tend to 0. In Section 1.2.2, we replace the distance between two
trajectories by the distance between a trajectory and a set. Finally, we combine the
two aspects in Section 1.2.3; the result obtained therein is used in Section 2 to prove
the existence of the value in zero-sum differential games with terminal payoff.
1.2.1 Induction
Let (u,v) ∈ U × V be a pair of controls. Define the trajectories x and w on [t0, tN ]
inductively: let x(t0) = x0 and w(t0) = w0 and suppose that x(t) and w(t) are
defined on [t0, tm] for some m = , . . . , N − 1; let (u
∗
m, v
∗
m) ∈ U × V be a couple of
optimal actions in the local game Γ(tm,x(tm),x(tm)−w(tm)); for all t ∈ [tm, tm+1],
put x(t) := x[tm,x(tm),u, v
∗
m](t) and w(t) := w[tm,w(tm), u
∗
m,v](t).
Corollary 1.1. ‖x(tN )−w(tN )‖
2 ≤ eA(‖x0 − w0‖
2 +B‖Π‖).
Proof. For any 0 ≤ m ≤ N , put dm := ‖x(tm)−w(tm)‖. By Lemma 1.1, one has:
d2m ≤ (1 + (tm − tm−1)A)d
2
m−1 +B(tm − tm−1)
2.
By induction, one obtains:
d2N ≤ exp(A
∑N
m=1
tm − tm−1)(d
2
0 +B
∑N
m=1
(tm − tm−1)
2).
The result follows using that
∑N
m=1 tm−tm−1 ≤ 1 and
∑N
m=1(tm−tm−1)
2 ≤ ‖Π‖.
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1.2.2 Distance to a set
Let W ⊂ [t0, 1]× R
n be a set satisfying the following properties:
• P1: For any t ∈ [t0, 1], W(t) := {x ∈ R
n | (t, x) ∈ W} is closed and nonempty.
• P2: For any (t, x) ∈ W and any t′ ∈ [t, 1]:
sup
u∈U
inf
v∈V
D(x[t, x, u,v](t′),W(t′)) = 0.
The first property ensures that the projection on W(t) is well defined for all t ∈
[0, 1]. Equivalent formulations of the second property were introduced by Aubin [2],
although the formulation P2 is inspired by the notion of stable bridge in [3].
Let x0 ∈ R
n, let w0 ∈ argminW(t0)‖x0−w0‖ be some closest point to x0 inW(t0)
and let v∗ be optimal in the local game Γ(t0, x0, x0 −w0).
Corollary 1.2. For all t ∈ [t0, 1] and all u ∈ U :
D2(x[t0, x0,u, v
∗](t),W(t)) ≤ (1 + (t− t0)A)D
2(x0,W(t0)) +B(t− t0)
2.
Proof. Let u ∈ U be fixed. Let u∗ be optimal in Γ(t0, x0, x0 − w0). By P2, for all
ε > 0 there exists vε ∈ V such that the point wε(t) := x[t0, w0, u
∗,vε](t) satisfies
D(wε(t),W(t)) ≤ ε. We use the following abbreviation: xu(t) := x[t0, x0,u, v
∗](t).
The triangular inequality gives D(xu(t),W(t)) ≤ ‖xu(t) − wε(t)‖ + ε. Taking the
limit, as ε→ 0, one has that:
D2(xu(t),W(t)) ≤ lim
ε→0
‖xu(t)−wε(t)‖
2.
By Lemma 1.1, ‖xu(t) − wε(t)‖
2 ≤ (1 + (t − t0)A)‖x0 − w0‖
2 + B(t − t0)
2 for all
ε > 0. The result follows because ‖x0 − w0‖ = D(x0,W(t0)) by definition.
1.2.3 A key Corollary
Let x0 ∈ W(t0). For any u ∈ U , define a trajectory xu on [t0, tN ] inductively: let
xu(t0) = x0 and suppose that xu is defined on [t0, tm] for somem = 0, . . . , N−1. Let
wm ∈ argminw∈W(tm)‖xu(tm)−w‖ be a closest point to xu(tm) inW(tm), and let v
∗
m
be optimal in the local game Γ(tm,xu(tm),xu(tm)−wm).
1 For all t ∈ [tm, tm+1], put
xu(t) := x[tm,xu(tm),u, v
∗
m](t). Define a control β(u) ∈ V by setting β(u) ≡ v
∗
m on
[tm, tm+1] for all 0 ≤ m < N . Clearly, xu(t) = x[t0, x0,u, β(u)](t), for all t ∈ [t0, tN ].
Note that the action v∗m used in the interval [tm, tm+1] depends only on the
current position xu(tm) and on the setW(tm), and that the former is a deterministic
function of v∗0 , . . . , v
∗
m−1 and of the restriction of u to the interval [t0, tm].
Consider β as a mapping from U to V. Then, for any u1,u2 ∈ U such that
u1 ≡ u2 on [t0, tm] for some 0 ≤ m < N , β(u1) ≡ β(u2) on [t0, tm+1]. In this sense,
β : U → V is nonanticipative.
Putting Corollaries 1.1 and 1.2 together, and using that D(x0,W(t0)) = 0, we
obtain the following result.
1We implicitly use two selection rules π1 = π1(W) and π2 defined as follows: π1 : [0, 1] × Rn → Rn
assigns to each (t, x) a closest point to x in W(t); π2 : [0, 1]× Rn × Rn → V assigns to each (t, x, ξ) an
optimal action in the local game Γ(t, x, ξ).
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Corollary 1.3. For any u ∈ U , D2(x[t0, x0,u, β(u)](tN ),W(tN )) ≤ e
AB‖Π‖.
This result can be interpreted as follows: suppose the state belongs to W at
time t0; then for any control u ∈ U (say, of player 1), there exists a piece-wise,
nonanticipative reply of player 2 such that the distance to W at some terminal time
vanishes as ‖Π‖ tends to 0. In terms of strategies, which will be defined in the next
Section, the result implies that player 2 has a strategy which keeps the state very
close to the set W. This property is used in Section 2 to prove the existence of the
value in zero-sum differential game. The epigraph of the lower value function will
play the role of the set W.
2 Differential Games
For any (t0, x0) ∈ [0, 1]×R
n, consider now the zero-sum differential game played in
[t0, 1] with the following dynamics:
x(t0) = x0, and x˙(t) = f(t,x(t),u(t),v(t)), a.e. on [t0, 1].
Definition 2.1. A strategy for player 2 is a map β : U → V such that, for some
finite partition s0 < s1 < · · · < sN of [t0, 1], for all u1,u2 ∈ U and 0 ≤ m < N :
u1 ≡ u2 a.e. on [s0, sm] =⇒ β(u1) ≡ β(u2) a.e. on [s0, sm+1].
These strategies are called nonanticipative strategies with delay (NAD) in [1], in
contrast to the classical nonanticipative strategies. The strategies for player 1 are
defined in a dual manner. Let A (resp. B) the set of strategies for Player 1 (resp. 2).
For any pair of strategies (α, β) ∈ A× B, there exists a unique pair (u¯, v¯) ∈ U × V
such that α(v¯) = u¯, and β(u¯) = v¯ (see [1]). This fact is crucial for it allows to
define x[t0, x0, α, β] := x[t0, x0, u¯, v¯] in a unique manner.
The payoff in a differential game has generally two components: a running payoff
and a terminal payoff, represented by the functions γ : [0, 1]×Rn×U × V → R and
g : Rn → R respectively. However, the classical transformation of a Bolza problem
into a Mayer problem, which gets rid of the running payoff, can also be applied
here: enlarge the state space from Rn to Rn+1, where the last coordinate represents
the cumulated payoff; define an auxiliary terminal payoff function g˜ : Rn+1 → R as
g˜(x, y) = g(x) + y; we thus obtain an equivalent differential game with no running
payoff. W.l.o.g. we assume from now on that γ ≡ 0. Assumption 3: g is Lipschitz
continuous.
We suppose that the Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold in the rest of the paper. The
differential game with initial time t0, initial state x0 and terminal payoff g is denoted
by G(t0, x0).
Introduce the lower and upper value functions:
V −(t0, x0) := sup
α∈A
inf
β∈B
g(x[t0, x0, α, β](1)),
V +(t0, x0) := inf
β∈B
sup
α∈A
g(x[t0, x0, α, β](1)).
The inequality V − ≤ V + holds everywhere. If V −(t0, x0) = V
+(t0, x0), the game
G(t0, x0) has a value. Notice that its lower and upper Hamiltonian of are precisely
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the maxmin and the minmax of the local games defined in Section 1. Consequently,
Assumption 2 is precisely Isaacs’ condition.
The lower value function satisfies the following super-dynamic programming princi-
ple (see [1]).
For all (t, x) ∈ [t0, 1]× R
n and all t′ ∈ [t0, 1]:
V −(t, x) ≥ sup
α∈A
inf
β∈B
V −(t′,x[t0, x0, α, β](t
′). (2.1)
A proof of a slightly weaker version of (2.1) can be found in the Appendix.
2.1 Existence and characterization of the value
Let φ : [t0, 1] ×R
n → R be a real function satisfying the following properties:
(i) x 7→ φ(t, x) is lower semicontinuous, for all t ∈ [t0, 1];
(ii) For all (t, x) ∈ [t0, 1]× R
n and t′ ∈ [t, 1]:
φ(t, x) ≥ sup
u∈U
inf
v∈V
φ
(
t′,x[t, x, u,v](t′)
)
;
(iii) φ(1, x) ≥ g(x), for all x ∈ Rn.
Definition 2.2. For any ℓ ∈ R, define the ℓ-level set of φ by:
Wφℓ = {(t, x) ∈ [t0, 1]× R
n | φ(t, x) ≤ ℓ},
Lemma 2.1. For any ℓ ≥ φ(t0, x0), the ℓ-level set of φ satisfies P1 and P2.
Proof. x0 ∈ W
φ
ℓ (t0) so that W
φ
ℓ (t0) is nonempty. By (i), W
φ
ℓ (t) is a closed set for
all t ∈ [0, 1]. The property (ii) implies that for any t ∈ [t0, 1], u ∈ U and n ∈ N
∗
there exists vn ∈ V such that:
ℓ ≥ φ(t0, x0) ≥ φ
(
t,x[t0, x0, u,vn](t)) −
1
n
. (2.2)
The boundedness of f implies that xn := x[t0, x0, u,vn](t) belongs to some compact
set. Consider a subsequence (xn)n such that limn→∞ φ(t, xn) = lim infn→∞ φ(t, xn),
and such that (xn)n converges to some x¯ ∈ R
n. Take the limit, as n→∞, in (2.2).
Using (i) again, we obtain:
ℓ ≥ φ(t0, x0) ≥ φ
(
t, x¯).
Consequently, x¯ ∈ Wφℓ (t) 6= ∅ and infn∈N∗ d
(
x[t0, x0, u,vn](t),W
φ
ℓ
(
t)) = 0. The
proof of these two properties still holds by replacing the initial data (i.e. (t0, x0) and
t ∈ [t0, 1]) by some (t, x) ∈ W
φ
ℓ and t
′ ∈ [t, 1]. Thus, Wφℓ satisfies P1 and P2.
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2.1.1 Extremal strategies in G(t0, x0)
Let Wφ ⊂ [t0, 1] × R
n be the φ(t0, x0)-level set of φ. Let π1 = π1(W
φ) and π2 be
two selection rules defined as follows: π1 : [0, 1] × R
n → Rn assigns to each (t, x) a
closest point to x in Wφ(t); π2 : [0, 1] × R
n × Rn → V assigns to each (t, x, ξ) an
optimal action in the local game Γ(t, x, ξ). Finally, let:
π : [0, 1] × Rn → V, (t, x) 7→ π2(t, x, x− π1(t, x)).
Definition 2.3. An extremal strategy β = β(φ,Π, π) : U → V is defined inductively
as follows: suppose that β is already defined in [t0, tm] for some 0 ≤ m < N , and let
xm = x[t0, x0,u, β](tm). Set β(u) ≡ π(tm, xm) on [tm, tm+1].
These strategies are inspired by the extremal aiming method of Krasovskii and
Subbotin (see Section 2.4 in [3]).
Proposition 2.1. For some C ≥ 0, and for any extremal strategy β = β(φ,Π, π):
g(x[t0, x0,u, β(u)](1)) ≤ φ(t0, x0) +C
√
‖Π‖, ∀u ∈ U .
Proof. Recall that xN = x[t0, x0,u, β(u)](1). By Lemma 2.1, W
φ satsifies P1 and
P2. Thus, by Corollary 1.3:
D2(xN ,W
φ(tN )) ≤ e
AB‖Π‖. (2.3)
Using (iii) and the fact that tN = 1 yields:
Wφ(tN ) = {x ∈ R
n| φ(1, x) ≤ φ(t0, x0)} ⊂ {x ∈ R
n| g(x) ≤ φ(t0, x0)}.
Let wN ∈ argminw∈Wφ(1)‖xN −w‖ be some closest point to xN in W
φ(1). Let κ be
the Lipschitz constant of g (assumption 3). Then:
g(xN ) ≤ g(wN ) + κ‖xN − wN‖,
≤ φ(t0, x0) + κd(xN ,W
φ(tN )).
The result follows from (2.3).
Proposition 2.1 applies to any function satisfying (i), (ii) and (iii). Consequently,
under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3:
V +(t0, x0) ≤ inf{φ(t0, x0) | φ : [t0, 1]× R
n → R satisfying (i), (ii), (iii)}. (2.4)
Consequently, the value exists if the lower value function V − satisfies (i)− (iii).
Theorem 2.4. The differential game G(t0, x0) has a value, characterized as:
V(t0, x0) = inf
φ satisfying
(i),(ii),(iii)
φ(t0, x0).
The strategies β(V,Π) are asymptotically optimal for player 2, as ‖Π‖ → 0.
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Proof. By definition, V −(1, x) = g(x), for all x ∈ Rn, so that (iii) is satified. The
property (ii) can be deduced directly from (2.1); Assumption 1 and 3 imply that
the map x 7→ V −(t, x) is Lipschitz continuous for all t ∈ [t0, 1]; in particular, (i) is
satisfied. These properties being classical, we have preferred to give the details in
the Appendix. Finally, let β = β(V,Π, π) be an extremal strategy. Proposition 2.1
gives:
V +(t0, x0) ≤ sup
u∈U
g
(
x[t0, x0,u, β(u)](1)
)
≤ V −(t0, x0) + C
√
‖Π‖.
The existence of the value is obtained by letting ‖Π‖ tend to 0. Moreover, note that
for any ε > 0, β is ε-optimal for sufficiently small ‖Π‖.
3 Appendix
Note that the classical subdynamic programming principle (2.1) implies (ii). Indeed,
any u ∈ U can be identified with a strategy that plays u on [t0, 1] regardless of v.
Then:
sup
α∈A
inf
β∈B
V −(t′,x[t0, x0, α, β])(t
′) ≥ sup
u∈U
inf
β∈B
V −(t′,x[t0, x0, u, β(u)])(t
′)
= sup
u∈U
inf
v∈V
V −(t′,x[t0, x0, u,v])(t
′).
The proofs of (2.1) and (ii) are essentially the same. We provide here a proof of the
latter because it is this version that we have used in the proof of Theorem 2.4.
Claim 3.1. V − satisfies (i) and (ii).
Proof. (i): Using Assumption 1 and Gronwall’s lemma one obtains that, for all
t ∈ [t0, 1], (u,v) ∈ U × V, and x, y ∈ R
n:∥∥x[t0, x,u,v](t)) − x[t0, y,u,v](t))∣∣ ≤ ec(t−t0)‖x− y‖.
Thus, by Assumption 3, for all (u,v) ∈ U × V, and for all x, y ∈ Rn:∣∣g(x[t0, x,u,v](1)) − g(x[t0, y,u,v](1))∣∣ ≤ κec(1−t0)‖x− y‖.
Consequently, the map x 7→ V −(t, x) is κec-Lipschitz continuous for all t ∈ [t0, 1].
(ii): Let (t, x) ∈ [t0, 1]× Rn, t′ ∈ [t, 1] and ε > 0 be fixed. The Lipschitz continuity
of z 7→ V −(t′, z) implies the existence of some δ > 0 such that any ε-optimal action
in G(t′, x′) is 2ε-optimal in G(t′, z), for all z ∈ B(x′, δ), which is the euclidean ball
of radius δ centered in x′. By compactness, let B(x, ‖f‖) be covered by some finite
family (Ei)i∈I of pairwise disjoint sets, each one included in a ball B(xi, δ) for some
(xi)i ∈ (R
n)I . Let αi ∈ A be an ε-optimal strategy for player 1 in V
−(t′, xi), and
use the notation xv(t
′) := x[x, t, u,v](t′). Then, by definition, for all v ∈ V :
g(x[t′,xv(t
′), αi,v](1))1{xv(t′)∈Ei} ≥ V
−(t′,x(t′))1{xv(t′)∈Ei} − 2ε.
For each u ∈ U , define a strategy αu ∈ A as follows: ∀t ∈ [t0, 1], ∀v ∈ V,
αu(v)(t) =
{
u if t ∈ [t, t′),
αi(v)(t) if t ∈ [t
′, 1], and xv(t
′) ∈ Ei.
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Note that αu is a NAD strategy in G(t, x). Indeed, let s1 < · · · < sN be a common
partition of [t′, 1] for the strategies (αi)i – this is possible because the family is finite.
Thus, αu is defined with respect to t < t
′ < s2 < · · · < sN . Now, for all v ∈ V:
g(x[x, t, αu,v](1)) =
∑
i∈I
g(x[t′,xv(t
′), αi,v](1))1{xv(t′)∈Ei},
≥
∑
i∈I
V −(t′,xv(t
′))1{xv(t′)∈Ei} − 2ε,
= V −(t′,xv(t
′))− 2ε,
Taking the infimum in V, and the supremum in U yields the desired result.
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